The Safe Sleep policy of Charlie Hale’s administration came
to an abrupt “sunset” on August 2. This
ended an idea in which the city and the homeless might come to an agreement as
to how public land, including sidewalks, might be utilized for sleeping. It
came in a package with other stated benefits for the homeless, including
storage for possessions, intentional campgrounds with porta potties and
sanitation pick up. Charlie Hales ended
the policy, implying that the homeless didn’t follow through on their part of
the deal. There were more complaints
than ever about trash, open drug use, tent fires and general chaos.
I agree that the Safe Sleep policy didn’t work, but I would
add that it was never given the opportunity to work. That the homeless were never included in
process of making this policy a success.
1. The policy wasn’t communicated well
to the homeless
The mayor’s office created a half-sheet flyer which was
intended to communicate to the homeless and advocates the details of the
policy. Unfortunately, it was filled
with policy language and it was better understood by the police and policy
makers than by those it was supposed to be communicating to. For communication to the homeless, a writer
used to working with homeless citizens should be used, so that the concerns of
the homeless might be addressed. The
policy was communicated clearly to only a few homeless citizens, especially
those placed in city-approved locations.
All others were forced to guess what exactly the policy meant.
2. The policy wasn’t organized well
Homeless citizens, like every citizen of Portland, need
certain shelter and certain possessions during the day as well as night. Many of them cook their own food and live
relatively independently. The policy
kept homeless citizens from their possessions during the day. But even so, there was only two places for
homeless citizens to keep their possessions during the day, and they were only
accessible to a tiny minority of them.
There was insufficient sanitation pick up.
If the mayor’s office had listened to the groups working
with homeless camps, as well as they worked with lawyers, policy makers and the
police, they would have understood the needs and the variety of locations of
homeless citizens throughout the metro region.
They would have known what the lifestyles of the homeless really were
and would have been able to draft a policy that would have been realistic for
their homeless citizens and not just the idea of a single man with a backpack.
3. "Safety" had too many exceptions
Because the policy was enacted by the mayor’s office, there
were many areas in Portland that were swept because they were outside the
influence of the mayor. Certain bureaus,
ODOT, Metro and other agencies felt no requirement to follow the mayor’s
policy. Clean and Safe, who is
contracted with the city through Central City Concern to clean up camps in the
downtown area continued to sweep without halting. Because there was no clear indication where
the Safe Sleep policy was enforced, the homeless didn’t know where they could
go to participate in it.
4. The policy depended on volunteers to enforce it
The city only had a few employees to communicate with the
homeless, and the police, not being social workers, didn’t see it as their job
to communicate the mayor’s policy, so the city depended on a number of unfunded
agencies to communicate the policy to the homeless. Boots on the Ground, an organization of
homeless advocates, would receive a list of homeless camps who were not in “compliance”
and they would be told to re-organize the camps or else the camps would be
swept. Boots and other agencies and
homeless communities were on hand to move the homeless to city-designated spots
when there were too many complaints about them in one area. And when they were set up in a designated
spot, these agencies were also told to organize the camps and to keep the
peace. If an area didn’t have a sanitation pick up, the volunteer organizations
were asked to pick up trash.
Although these organizations did what they could, they did
not have the staff to connect with the dozens of camps they were asked to
organize. They were not even given gas
reimbursements, let alone with any funds to hire more staff, or to provide
porta potties or trash bags. The city
drained these organizations without providing anything but more work to do. Eventually the resources of the volunteer
groups were reduced and they were no longer able to assist the city.
5. The policy was measured by public support
In the end, the measure of success of the policy didn’t
depend on how well the homeless complied to the policy, but on the reduction of
complaints to the city about the homeless.
The one area that the policy did succeed was in giving the homeless the
false impression that they didn’t need to hide anymore. The mayor’s office didn’t, and still does
not, understand that homeless citizens to be acceptable to many of their housed
neighbors, they would have to be hidden. As long as they saw people sleeping in tents,
there would always be some who assumed that defecation, trash, drug use came
with it. So the complaints increased,
but there wasn’t confirmation that most of the complaints were realistic.
There were many camps that were filled with trash and had
needle caps. But for the most part, the
camps were never told, “You could stay here if you would just keep it
clean. Here are trash bags. Fill them and set them on the side of the
road and they will be picked up.”
It is interesting, that the Safe Sleep policy did make one
major difference among homeless citizens.
Many more of them clean up. They
get trash bags wherever they can and clean up their space. They know that it is a basic requirement of
them living in their space.
Many camps did major clean up. But because the camp next to them did not, it
was assumed that they were all the problem.
If an area of camps are swept there was a lot of “trash” left
behind. But that is the consequence of
sweeps. People have to leave essential
possessions in a hurried sweep.
If the Safe Sleep policy were built with homeless leaders,
if it were better communicated, if the city had paid workers to enforce it in a
friendly and helpful way, if the policy were given more time to enact social
change among the homeless population, despite public complaints, it would have
worked. As it stands, it is an example
of poor government planning.
